For the people who missed Barack Obama’s speech in Berlin yesterday, here it is again. The event will certainly become a modern political classic!

By Hannah Lucinda Smith

Radovan Karadžic cut a striking figure in the early 1990s; and no less of one in 2008. Television reports of the Bosnian Serb war leader’s capture made for compulsive viewing this week, just as interviews with the stout and grandiose self appointed leader of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia Herzcegovina did at the height of the Yugoslav conflict. Karadžic the fugitive – an enigmatic and long bearded spiritualist lecturing on alternative medicine – is just as revoltingly compulsive to watch as he was over a decade ago.

But how much can the capture of one man mean for the Balkans, and their path towards Europe? Much has happened in the region since the end of the conflict. Buildings and infrastructure have been reconstructed and cities are edging their way back onto the tourist map. Refugees have returned, although the return has been patchy and fraught with problems. National economies, if not uniformly booming, are certainly blossoming. But psychologically this is still the most fragile corner of Europe: Kosovo’s self proclaimed independence in February shone a spotlight on the continuing spurts of ethnic hatred in the Balkans. It also reminded the EU that no matter how far rebuilding, economies and refugee return have taken the Balkans, it cannot truly be part of a peaceful Europe whilst resentment and anger rather than rationality govern political debate.

His capture is certainly no small deal; Karadžic was allegedly responsible for some of the worst outrages of the Bosnian war. Sarajevo and Srebrenica: an alliteration of grotesqueness that rolls off the tongue, bywords for mind-blowing cruelty.

As long as Karadžic evaded justice, he poured acid on the open wounds of all those who suffered by his hand. Until he was finally arrested on a bus in a Belgrade suburb on Monday it was widely assumed that his safehold was the Republika Srpska, the autonomous Serbian region in Bosnia where he is held in such high regard that a street was recently named after him. Many Bosnian Muslims believed furthermore that the Serbian government and police were lethargic in their efforts to find him, if not actually complicit in his continuing freedom. Certainly the dismissal of the head of the Serbian Intelligence days before his capture will add hugely to that speculation. But now his living victims can have reason to feel that they could be approaching a denouement.

Speaking after a screening of ‘Scorpions: A Home Movie’ in Manchester last December, Serbian human rights activist Natasha Kandic described cracks appearing in the wall of silence and denial which had grown up after the Yugoslav conflict. The film, which had only recently come to light, was made by a member of a Serbian paramilitary group, and showed conclusively for the first time how Muslim and Albanian men and boys were rounded up and slaughtered in their villages. It led to the arrest and conviction of several of the units members for war crimes in Bosnia and Kosovo. That was a crack in the wall. So too is the arrest of Karadžic. And although Karadžic’s arrest provoked some nationalist anger on the streets of Belgrade, these past few days have, for the first time, it felt like the Serbian state is taking emotional steps towards Europe and reconciliation.

The country’s unsteady path towards Europe has taken some heavy blows over recent months, but this could be the start of smoother times ahead. Yugoslavia in the 1990s was ripped apart by Radovan Karadžic and men like him. Between them, those men – Serb, Croat and Muslim - took vicious and insidious nationalism to their bosoms, and pulled and ripped at the map of South Eastern Europe until it was bloodstained confetti in their hands. They were the architects of the Balkans’ disintegration. It is only when those men have faced justice that the real rebuilding can begin.

Hannah Lucinda Smith graduated in 2006 with a degree in Politics and Modern History, and now works as a researcher on Channel 4’s Dispatches and as a freelance journalist.

By Dimitris Tsarouhas

A year and a half ago, Austrian politics returned to its stable pattern of grand coalition governments. Following the turbulence of the centre- and far-right coalition, the 2006 election result led to the formation of yet another coalition between the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Peoples’ Party (ÖVP). Other than in Germany, however, the coalition was not to last for too long, and a few days ago ÖVP leader and Vice-Chancellor Wilhelm Molterer announced that the party ‘had enough’, and that it was going to the people to secure a new mandate. SPÖ was all too happy to oblige, and Austrians will go to the polls on 28 September. Why did the coalition collapse 18 months after its formation? What are the September election prospects, and is Austria in danger of imitating Italy in the frequency with which it holds general elections from now on?

For the ÖVP, the straw that broke the camel’s back was the decision by the SPÖ leadership to publish an open letter in the country’s equivalent of the Sun, (Kronen Zeitung) calling for a referendum on a future EU Treaty that could emerge provided the Irish ‘no’ is dealt with. The mildly Eurosceptic tone of the letter and the decision to publish in a paper long regarded as heeding the xenophobic messages of the far-right (FPÖ, BZÖ) irritated a few in the party itself, but it infuriated the ÖVP leadership. For former Chancellor Schüssel, SPÖ changed its stance on Europe and ‘betrayed its own soul’. There is a certain merit to the argument regarding the populist instincts underpinning the move, but it is mostly hyperbole. Austrians have become intensely Eurosceptic, blaming ‘Brussels’ for all things imaginable and are keen to blend real problems (e.g. ECJ decisions on workers’ rights) with prejudice dating back to the Union’s decision to monitor human rights respect in Austria after FPÖ became a governing party.

The bitterness towards ‘Eurocrats’ has not gone away since the late 1990s, and combined with rising prices and growing inequality has reinforced the perception of an EU indifferent to everyday problems and citizens’ concerns. If Austrian social democracy wishes to overcome such prejudices whilst initiating a real, constructive dialogue as to our common future in the EU family, then its policy ’shift’ is not only welcome, but also necessary. Arguing for a Social Europe cannot be the exclusive domain of Eurosceptic parties. It is the duty of modern social democracy to forge progressive coalitions of convinced Europeanists, willing to take the Union to a more progressive direction. The only way to do that is to make the case – and in the process unearth what is not going well with the current EU so as to change it. The ÖVP argument of ‘betrayal’ implies that whoever believes in Europe cannot criticize the EU. That is an absurd argument, which only reinforces popular distrust towards ‘EU elites’.

In fact, the reasons for the government’s collapse go much deeper, and date back to its formation. In the 2006 election the Social Democrats emerged as winners, and many in the ÖVP never accepted the ‘wisdom’ of that result. Having triumphed in the previous electoral contest, ÖVP was now clearly irritated by the prospect of relinquishing the Chancellor’s position and having to negotiate from a position of relative weakness. Former Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel made sure that his party dominated key Cabinet portfolios of the 2006-2008 government (Foreign Ministry, Economy Ministry, Interior Ministry), and the government’s programme bore a heavy imprint of ÖVP priorities and goals. From early on, it was clear that many in the SPÖ were irritated with the timidity of SPÖ leader and later Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer, whose inability to drive through most of the policies promised prior to the election frustrated his party comrades. In fact, a few weeks prior to the end of the coalition and following heavy defeats in local elections, Gusenbauer was deposed as SPÖ leader and his successor, Werner Neumann, will head the SPÖ ticket in September. Turbulence inside the SPÖ combined with unfavourable media coverage of the Chancellor and the continuing bitterness of the ÖVP who sought to block all moves profiting the SPÖ ’social profile’, led to the collapse of an already tired and timid government. The two parties rarely spoke the same language, and political immobilisme damaged the image of the government from very early on.

If that was not bad enough, the 28 September elections do not promise to change things much. Austrians dislike ’spoilers’ who obstruct work under way, and even if this work was far from brilliant, they are likely to punish those deemed responsible for the coalition’s premature end. Which party that will be remains to be seen: is the Molterer line on SPÖ and Europe going to prevail, or will SPÖ claims that its social agenda was obstructed by an uncooperative ÖVP carry the day? What is certain is that both governing parties start the election campaign from a position of weakness, and the far-right is likely to gain as a result. However, both parties claim that a coalition with FPÖ is not part of their post-election plans. Were they to hold on to that after 28 September, they would probably need to form a new grand coalition to obtain a parliamentary majority – which begs the question why the country needed to runt to the polls in the first place. It is, to be sure, an unusual state of confusion in Austria’s modern political history.

The resuscitation of grand coalitions has proven far from successful, and the public’s disenchantment with the political process has reached new highs. To prevent the Italianisation of the electoral cycle and the creation of successive electoral contests, a few options are available. Should the electoral result permit it, the best one seems to be the formation of a red-green coalition. SPÖ and the Green Party are politically close enough to form a coalition, and they could seek to imitate the Schröder-Fischer experiment in Germany. This could pave the way for the implementation of failed reforms in health and social care, a failure that the SPÖ attributes to ÖVP obstinacy. Such a coalition could also tackle the EU issue from a realistic perspective, taking popular concerns into account but also providing leadership in making a clear argument for an integrated and social European Union. The time may have come to try out such an alternative.

Dimitris Tsarouhas is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Turkey

After several questions about how to subscribe to our quarterly journal Social Europe (see www.social-europe.eu) I just want to mention a few points that might not be as known as we thought.

This is the Blog of the quarterly e-journal Social Europe. The journal itself is only available as pdf from our website www.social-europe.eu and via EBSCO library services.

As the journal is free of charge (with a suggested donation), all you have to do to receive each new issues is leaving your email address in the newsletter field on the right of this post. This will ensure that you are amongst the first people to get each new issues.

The next journal - dealing with the French EU Presidency - will include an article by the French Foreign Secretary Bernhard Kouchner amongst others and will be published later this month. So, this is a good time to join the journal list.

By Christopher McGuinness

It’s 5:00, and I’m heading home from work for the evening. As I move onto the street, multiple security cameras track my short walk to the train station, where I step through a metal detector before being allowed into the station. All the while, military helicopters hover overhead.

No, I’m not in Oceania, the fictional setting of George Orwell’s 1984. I’m not in Baghdad, either. I’m in central London, England, and it’s June 2008.

From German aerial offensives in two world wars, to protracted IRA bombing campaigns, and through to the terrorist attacks of July 7, 2005, Londoners are quite used to dealing with daily security threats. The national and local governments have fought back against all scales of crime with increased surveillance, stronger police presence (including the use of volunteer officers), and substantial legal reforms.

In my short time living here, London has changed. Our new mayor, Boris Johnson, was elected largely on a “tough justice” platform. In a Daily Telegraph op-ed penned earlier this week regarding one such national legal reform (which further erodes our civil liberties, many have argued) he wrote:

“We want to be protected from terrorists, yet we have a feeling that the state is everywhere eroding our ancient liberties - bossing, bullying, photographing us at every corner. We need to be clear about the trade-off. The price of liberty is a small but appreciable loss of security; the price of security is a loss of liberty.”

But for all these changes, how much safer is London? And how safe do Londoners feel? While it’s still too early to tell whether policy shifts and legal changes have had any noticeable effect on reducing crime, CCTV has been a bust thus far. Billions of pounds were spent on the cameras, with no real idea how police would use the pictures or how pictures would be used in court. Only 3% of crimes have been solved using CCTV, prompting one senior police official to call it “an utter fiasco.” Moreover, a recent wave of stabbings involving young people (eleven of sixteen teens murdered here this year were stabbed to death) have created enough worry that personal security firms have reported a 70 per cent increase in business.

Changes need to be made. CCTV and increased police presence would be much more effective outside of central London, where most of the violent crime and gang activity takes place. Most importantly, the approach needs to be changed, and entrenched social problems need to be addressed before real progress can be made.

If the price of security is a loss of liberty, Mayor Boris Johnson and Prime Minister Gordon Brown have given us poor value. A recent poll shows that a majority of Londoners don’t mind having some of their liberties taken away for the sake of security. But for what? Our civil liberties have been curbed in the name of getting tough on crime with no appreciable result, and it’s time for our officials to hold up their end of the bargain.

Christopher McGuinness is a freelance journalist based in London. He holds an MSc in International Relations from the London School of Economics and his areas of interest include foreign policy analysis, international history, and development.

Partly because of the outcome in Iraq, Iran has been able to recover the dominant geopolitical position it seemed to have lost after the events of September 11, 2001. Yet the country remains as obscure to Western observers and politicians as it did after the Iranian revolution in 1979.

No agreement exists over the best way to respond to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, despite the expanding diplomatic structure of “constructive engagement” combined with coercive sanctions and the threat of military intervention. Confusion persists over the complex political system and over the implications of the Ahmadinejad presidency, as well as over the economic opportunities that Iran might offer or the regional implications of its newfound ascendancy.

Watch Professor Ali Ansari (University of St. Andrews) and Roxanne Farmanfarmaian discuss these issues at the Global Policy Institute.

Globalisation. The Flat World. Outsourcing. Free Trade.

Each of these phrases is a flashpoint in one of the most heated debates of our lifetime: is globalisation a force for good, or is it a policy that is sure to destroy the economic foundation of the United States and Europe while exporting our wealth and prosperity overseas?

Watch Gabor Steingart, Senior Washington Correspondent of DER SPIEGEL, discuss the Globalisation issue.

By Henning Meyer

The Irish ‘no’ in the referendum on the Lisbon Treaty has driven Europe into its next major crisis only three years after the French and Dutch rejected the Constitutional Treaty. The constitution disaster was followed by a ‘period of reflection’ which ended with the negotiation of the Lisbon Treaty. But what will follow now, after the new agreement too was rejected in an EU member state?

Although Europe’s political leaders are arguing for the continuation of the ratification process, there is little doubt that the Irish result seriously threatens the future of the Lisbon Treaty – even if the Irish put it up for a second ballot.

In the wake of the Constitution debacle the EU made considerable efforts to communicate better with citizens, explain its complex political structure and why it needs reform. Even though still more could have been done, it seems increasingly unlikely that the electorates across Europe just do not understand the message or cannot see the benefit of the treaties on offer. There is a deeper and more fundamental problem.

In the European Union of 27 member states, there is no single vision for the EU and no common idea in what direction it ought to develop. Should the Union simply be a single market or should it also have a more political role? Should it develop a stronger social dimension or is destructive internal competition acceptable? There is a wide variety of competing visions amongst member states, some ambitious, many not. In such a situation, the negotiation and ratification of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ treaty setting the basic rules as well as elements of the future EU direction is very difficult if not impossible to achieve, as the recent results suggest.

Progress on specific policy issues is still possible – as can be seen in the EU’s day-to-day work – but the setting of a new universal course seems unworkable. The Nice Treaty of 2001, itself an agreement with many flaws, is still the latest accepted EU treaty. Since EU membership went up from 15 to 27 no new treaty could be ratified. This is not to blame enlargement for the current impasse, but with almost double the old membership it has become harder and harder to reach consensus.

In such a climate, everybody is frustrated by the European integration process. Countries that want to integrate further are continuously held back by other EU member states blocking progress. And more reluctant members feel pressured to accept political compromises they do not really want. It might thus be time for the EU to make its structures more flexible and provide a framework for both, the enthusiastic and the more reluctant Europeans.

Some of the institutional decision-making mechanisms need urgent reform and these need to be binding for all members. But instead of more attempts to maintain the same level of integration across the whole membership, it may be time to seriously contemplate the creation of a structured ‘multi-speed’ European integration process.

In some respects, this ‘multi-speed’ Europe already exists. For instance not all member states are signatories of the Schengen agreement, that abolished systematic border controls, and not all EU countries adopted the Euro. One should seriously think about a wider application of ‘multi-speed’ integration and what sort of changes to the European Union’s institutional structure and decision-making processes such a shift of philosophy would involve.

The emergence of a ‘core Europe’ – with other countries at the fringes - might reinvigorate the integration process that has been bleeding dynamism for years. This is a very difficult task but it might be more promising than the alternative: muddling through without being able to resolve the underlying conflict of competing, and maybe even incompatible, European visions. A ‘multi-speed’ Europe is certainly not the best solution but it may be the most feasible.

Henning Meyer is Head of European Programme at the Global Policy Institute (www.global-policy.com) at London Metropolitan University and Managing Editor of Social Europe Journal (www.social-europe.eu)