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We may not know, but we think we do.
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McDowell, Agency, Imagery and Sensation
I've mentioned here a few times before that I'm impressed by some remarks by Wittgenstein and Sartre on agency and imagination. The idea is roughly that one difference between typical experiences of imagery and typical experiences of percepts is that...
Truth in Fiction and '555' phone numbers
In many ordinary contexts, the author gets to determine what's true in the fiction. It's true in The Butter-Battle Book that VanItch has acquired a bitsy big-boy boomeroo, and what makes it true in the fiction is the simple fact...
Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Propositions
We believe, disbelieve, withhold, expect, etc. things for reasons all the time. What kind of thing are these reasons? Some say they're propositions. Call their view abstractionism. I say they're mental states. Call my view statism. Here's an argument that...
Awareness, Experience, and Facts about Experiences
Let's say that S is aware of X just in case S is in some intentional state at least partly about X. Now consider: (A1) It is conceptually necessary that if S is currently having a conscious experience e, then...
PETA, Slavery, and Non-human Animals
PETA sparks outrage once again. The New Haven Register reports: People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, a national animal rights group, posted giant photographs of people, mostly black Americans, being tortured, sold and killed, next to photographs of animals,...
Defective Speech Acts
Conversations with a philosopher from Austin and reading a philosopher named Austin have helped me considerably in coming up with several of these examples. (1) It's raining, but I don't believe it is. (2a) I promise to go, but I...
A Short Argument
It would take too much stage-setting to say how or why this is important, so I'm just going to present it. It's a short argument to prove that by sincerely saying that I believe P I needn?t express a belief...
The Luckiest Epistemologist on the Face of the Earth
I'm defending my dissertation in a few weeks and going to Texas Tech for the school year to perform Moore's proof in front of a larger audience of intro students. This means that Fake Barn Country is receiving its first...
An Inconsistent Set
This post was inspired by a dissertation workgroup session, in which we discussed Ben Fiedor's work. The following propositions appear to be inconsistent. (1) You ought to believe many and various things. (2) If you ought to believe something, then...
Unalloyed Reliabilism and Knowledge by Pure Speculation
It has recently been cleverly argued that knowledge is reliable belief, no truth required. Call the view "unalloyed reliabilism." An unalloyed reliabilist should have something to say about claims like this one recently made by former ambassador Joe Wilson. Wilson...
An Argument Against Dream Skepticism ... For Some of Us
It's hard to find fault with this argument. (1) I am a caretaker for a human infant. (2) At any given time, it is highly unlikely that a human infant's caretaker is asleep. (3) Therefore, it is highly unlikely that...
Expressing Intentions in the English Language
I ran into stiff opposition last time on a matter of formulation. (Many thanks to everyone who chimed in.) Since formulation is half the battle, I have to ask, which if any of the following do you readily recognize as...
Certainty without Knowledge?
On Sportscenter last night Buster Olney said: There are other major players that I'm sure - but I don't know for sure - took steriods. The context: Rafael Palmeiro was suspended for violating the league's steriods policy. Olney was saying...
Moorean Paradox for Practical Reasoning
Jamie and I have discussed this around the department a couple times in the last several weeks, and he deserves (at least!) partial credit for any insights developed here. It is well known that there is something unacceptably odd about...
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